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We can share various feelings with others just through observation, as if it were an auto-
matic resonance.This connective function between the self and others could promote the
facilitation of our social communication; however, it is still unclear as to how it works in
terms of self-other representation. In this study, we showed participants a picture of a
model holding a ball, which was weighted with sand. We instructed participants to move
one of their arms to a horizontal position and hold it immobile.Those participants who knew
the actual weight of the ball (1 kg) tended to raise this arm above the horizontal, in response
to their expectation of the need to resist the weight of the ball.This compensatory reaction
to the illusion of heaviness suggests that our bodily resonance could be mandatory and
predictive. We discuss this new behavioral phenomenon in terms of motor simulation or
the mirror-neuron system.
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INTRODUCTION
When we are watching movies or home videos, we can enjoy the
experiences of a character as if we are undergoing these expe-
riences ourselves. A clear example of this might be a situation
wherein a character is in pain, or, additionally, some people may
strain themselves when watching weight lifting. Simulation theory
might explain such automatic responses, that is, observing another
person may automatically generate anticipation of the same expe-
rience in oneself (e.g., Jeannerod and Pacherie, 2004; Thioux and
Keysers, 2010). Action and perception might be fundamentally
coupled (James, 1890; Watanabe, 2008); therefore, observers may
have the capacity to simulate a variety of different information that
is available from others: tactile sensation (Keysers et al., 2004),
pain (Singer et al., 2004), emotional state (Platek et al., 2005;
Palagi et al., 2009; de Greck et al., 2012), and motor performance
(Calvo-Merino et al., 2005; Lahav et al., 2007; Aglioti et al., 2008).
These social cognitive functions that allow us to understand what
others are experiencing are often broadly referred to as empathy
(Decety and Ickes, 2009), and might be underpinned by neural
mechanisms, such as the mirror-neuron system (MNS; Iacoboni,
2009).
Among these, the domain of perception and action, which does
not involve emotional reactions, is referred to as bodily resonance,
motor contagion, motor simulation, automatic imitation, or direct
matching (Iacoboni et al., 1999; Blakemore and Frith, 2005; Brass
and Heyes, 2005; Schutz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007; Aglioti et al.,
2008; Liepelt et al., 2010). Some studies have suggested that this
simulation of others’ sensation could be “mental re-enaction,”
which implies that we simulate according to our own previous
experiences (Heyes et al., 2005; Prinz, 2006), because an observer
lacking the specific representation of a given feeling may hardly be
capable of directly simulating someone experiencing this feeling
(that is, correspondence problem; Brass and Heyes, 2005; Singer,
2006). This may be especially true of skilled and complicated
actions, such as dancing or piano playing (Calvo-Merino et al.,
2005; Lahav et al., 2007), for which specific training is required
(Heyes et al., 2005). It seems as though we have the capacity to
simulate the action of others if that action is also included in our
own repertoire of actions. However, those who have never experi-
enced weight lifting can also simulate the sensations experienced
by others undertaking those activities. Therefore, another possi-
bility may be that the simulation is through “predictive encoding
or computational interpretation”(Hurley, 2008), and might not be
limited to sensations that have already been experienced (Danziger
et al., 2009). The interpretation of the actions of others, which are
visually identical, but have different contexts, may affect the reac-
tions of observers (Iacoboni et al., 2005), suggesting that we can
simulate the actions of others predictively (Blakemore and Frith,
2005) and even estimate background intentions or goals (Liepelt
et al., 2008, 2010) as long as those actions are simple (Flanagan
and Johansson, 2003; Fogassi et al., 2005). As is obvious, this idea
is not contradictory to mental re-enaction theory, because previ-
ous experiences could help this predictive computation, especially
with regard to skilled actions. A previous study suggested that
pro-basketball players, but not big fans of basketball, could pre-
dict the future success or failure of the shots of others (Aglioti et al.,
2008). Nevertheless, our first hypothesis is that our motor simula-
tion might be realized by predictive encoding of the sensation of
others, according to the interpretation of the situation.
These phenomena, wherein we can simulate the sensations of
others automatically using our own body, might sound passive
and mandatory; therefore, some studies refer to these kinds of
illusions as “contagion,” in which we feel non-existent pain by
observing others, for example, when we see or hear something
non-existent in perceptual illusions (Singer et al., 2004; Watanabe,
2008; Palagi et al., 2009). However, whether this simulation might
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really be driven mandatorily remains unclear, although some pre-
vious studies have suggested that some types of empathy including
motor simulation could be driven automatically (Bien et al., 2009;
de Greck et al., 2012). In other words, it is a question of whether
we ignore the information available from others and inhibit our
simulation. This is also essential in terms of the neural mecha-
nism. It is now well established that a neuronal system, named
the MNS, exists in both monkeys and humans. During action
observation, the neural structures involved in the execution of the
observed actions are recruited in the brain of the observer through
the MNS, as if that person is the agent of the action (Rizzolatti and
Craighero, 2004). If the motor simulation is based on the MNS,
which does not distinguish between external (others) and inter-
nal (self) action representation, this process should be mandatory.
However, a question that often emerges is that why, if this is so,
do we not imitate with others all the time (Brass and Heyes, 2005;
Pineda, 2008)? Therefore, the MNS probably possesses an inhib-
itive component, which keeps us from having resonant reactions
for everything we see (Brass and Heyes, 2005), because having
an automatic process such as this is not always appropriate for
effective social behavior (Lee and Tsai, 2010). Therefore, a second
hypothesis is that the observation of others would mandatorily
affect our own mental state, but that we would simultaneously
compensate automatically for this transmitted sensation.
The present study suggests that our motor simulation would
be predictive and mandatory, and we attempt to demonstrate this
by administering the new illusory phenomenon: heaviness conta-
gion. We showed participants a picture of another person’s hand
holding what appeared to be a lightweight ball. In reality, the ball
was weighted with sand (1 kg). Participants were instructed to hold
their arms in a horizontal position and to keep them immobile.
We focused on the arm movements of the participants when they
observed another person’s hand holding a ball. In Experiment 1
(A, B), only the group who knew that the ball was heavy raised their
arms above the horizontal in response to their expectation of the
need to resist the illusory heaviness, suggesting that the heaviness
contagion is predictive and mandatory. In Experiment 2 (A, B),
we showed that heaviness contagion is driven by observing others
(not objects), and in conditions in which the self (participants)
and others are in the same situation (i.e., a similarity effect), sug-
gesting that the heaviness contagion might be a possible expression
of motor simulation as well as empathy.
GENERAL METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
All the participants were right-handed university students (hand-
edness index >8: H.N. handedness inventory (Hatta and
Kawakami, 1995), and none of them attended more than one
experiment. They were recruited randomly from an introductory
psychology class, and written informed consent was obtained from
all participants before the experiments were conducted. All par-
ticipants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, hearing,
and somatosensation and no neurological abnormalities.
APPARATUS
The experiments took place in a silent, dim room. In order to
display the visual stimuli and conduct the experiment, we used
MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA). The visual stimuli
were presented on a virtual screen through a head-mounted dis-
play (Experiment 1A), white board through a projector (Exper-
iment 1B), or PC display (Experiment 2AB). The hand posi-
tions of the participants were recorded during the task by using
a wireless mid-space mouse (Experiment 1A), a 3D motion-
capture device (Experiment 1B), or a high-speed video camera
(Experiment 2AB).
STIMULI
The visual stimuli consisted of life-sized pictures of a model’s hand
holding a ball, as shown in Figure 1. Some previous studies sug-
gest that personal information (e.g., sex, hand size, mole, skin
color, etc.) can affect the degree of empathy that participants feel
for others (see General Discussion for detail); therefore, in order to
exclude such information, the model wore a blue rubber glove. The
weighted ball shown in the visual stimuli (Weighted Ball, Regent
Far East, Inc., Ashiya, Japan) weighed 1 kg and was 40 cm round.
It appeared to be a normal, lightweight rubber ball; however, it
was actually filled with sand to add weight. In some conditions, we
also used pictures of a hand without the ball, or showed pictures
of the ball placed on objects (a wooden block). The weight stimuli
were identically weighted balls. Some participants held the ball in
their left hand, which was resting on the table, while others held
an identical-looking, but light weight (130 g), ball, from which the
sand had been removed.
PROCEDURE
All participants sat in front of the display or screen. Before the
experiment began, they received brief training to ensure familiarity
with the instruments and experimental requirements. In the exper-
iment itself, we instructed each participant to hold their right hand
in a horizontal position throughout the trial, which lasted 30−90 s
depending on the experiments. We intentionally manipulated the
duration of visual stimuli presentation between experiments in
order to suggest duration- or timecourse-independence. The arm
was first held out straight, to ensure what was felt to be a horizontal
FIGURE 1 | Visual stimuli used in the present study.
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position. When the arm was properly positioned, the visual stim-
ulus appeared. We instructed the participants to remain immobile
when the stimulus appeared. We then recorded the height of the
hand, if it was raised, throughout the remainder of the trial. After
the trial, the participants were asked to lower the hand and relax.
DATA ANALYSIS
In order to measure the hand position, we translated the row pixel
data into Euclidean distance (i.e., mm), and the starting position
was set at zero, so that a positive value of hand height meant
that the participant’s hand was raised from its starting position.
These values are useful when observing the time course of the
hand movement of the participants. Furthermore, we calculated
movement velocity (average hand position displacement per sec-
ond: mm/s) during the task, for comparison among conditions or
groups in each experiment. A positive value of movement velocity
meant that the position of the hand was being progressively raised
during that period.
ETHICS STATEMENT
The protocol of the present study was approved by the local ethics
committee (The Ethical Committee on Human Experimentation
of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, The University of
Tokyo).
EXPERIMENT 1A
In this experiment, we suggested that automatic predictive com-
pensation would occur in response to a simulated feeling. We
hypothesized that participants would raise their hand when
observing a person who feels heaviness in the hand because they




Forty university students (26 males and 14 females, mean
age= 19.0 years, range= 18−21 years) were randomly divided
into four groups: the BB (Ball seen, Ball held), BN (Ball seen,
No ball held), NB (No ball seen, Ball held), and NN (No ball
seen, No ball held) groups. In this experiment, only the weighted
ball (1 kg) was used as a prop. For example, those in the BB
group saw a model’s hand holding the weighted ball, and held
an identically weighted ball in their left hands, whereas those in
the NN group saw the model’s hand holding nothing, and held
no ball themselves. In the BB and NB groups, participants held
the ball and were therefore aware of its weight. In the NN and BN
group, participants had no information regarding the weight of
the ball.
Apparatus
The head-mounted display device (GVD-510-3D, Shenzhen
Oriscape Electronic Co., Ltd., Shenzhen, Guangdong, China) was
attached to a chin rest, and the participants looked through a
device that displayed the image of a 28˚ visual angle virtual screen.
The apparatus was arranged so that it appeared as though the vir-
tual screen was located just beyond the reach of the participants
(approximately 60 cm). An eye pad prevented them from see-
ing their hands, and hand positions were measured every second
(1 Hz), using a wireless mid-space mouse (BOMU-W24A/BL, Buf-
falo, Inc., Nagoya, Japan). This device weighed 135 g and was
equipped with a gyroscopic sensor that allowed it to be used in
the air.
Procedure
Each participant sat in front of the chin rest, on which they
each placed their chin. Their right arm was held out straight,
using the mouse device to ensure a horizontal position. When the
arm was properly positioned, the participant clicked the mouse
button once. Following a random interval of 1-2 s, to allow for
micro-motions caused by clicking the mouse, the visual stimulus
appeared on the virtual screen for 45 s. The task requirement was
to remain immobile when the stimulus appeared. Each participant
completed a single trial.
Questionnaire
After the experiment, participants completed a retrospective ques-
tionnaire designed to measure the extent to which they felt as
though the hand of the model was their own hand, and therefore
actually felt the weight of the ball as presented on the screen. It
was explained that the purpose of the questionnaire was to sim-
ply provide information regarding impressions of the task, and
participants were encouraged to answer freely. It was expected
that this instruction would avoid the possibility of an influence of
experimenter effects or demand characteristics on responses. The
questionnaire consisted of five items, each of which asked for an
accuracy rating of a particular statement using a five-point scale.
The statements were as follows: (1) It felt as though your hand was
weary and numb. (2) It seemed as if the hand on the screen was
your own hand. (3) It felt like your hand was moving lower. (4)
It seemed as if the ball was in your own hand. (5) Your hand felt
the weight of the ball. Participants in NN group had neither seen
nor held the ball, so they rated answered for only three statements:
Q1, 2, and 3. The topics “resonance with the model’s hand” and
“a feeling of weight” were included in questions 2, 4, and 5, and
questions 1 and 3 respectively.
Results and discussion
The time courses of the hand position of the participants indi-
cated that only those in the BB group tended to raise their
right hand gradually, whereas those in the other groups kept
their hand almost immobile (Figure 2). A two-way ANOVA (two
visual stimuli× two weight stimuli) was conducted to examine
the movement velocity of the four groups (Figure 3). These
analyses demonstrated a significant interaction [F(1.39)= 4.88,
p< 0.05], significant simple main effect of visual stimuli under
the ball-held condition [F(1.36)= 6.16, p< 0.05], and significant
simple main effect of weight stimuli under the ball-seen condi-
tion [F(1.36)= 11.67, p< 0.01]. It is suggested that only those
participants who saw a model holding the weighted ball and held
an identical weighted ball in their left hands raised their right
hand.
The results of the questionnaires were then analyzed (Figure 4).
The NN group did not answer questions 4 and 5; therefore, for
statistical analysis we conducted a two-way ANOVA to all five
questions for just three groups (five questions× three groups),
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FIGURE 2 |Time course of the height of the hand in each group in Experiment IA.
FIGURE 3 | Movement velocity in each group in Experiment IA.
omitting the NN group. These results were then analyzed further
using Ryan’s multi-comparison method (i.e., R-E-G-W’s F test).
These calculations revealed significant main effects for groups:
F(2.27)= 5.99, p< 0.01. Main effects for the questions were
also significant: F(4.108)= 33.73, p< 0.01; however, the interac-
tion was not significant: F(8.108)= 0.84, p> 0.50. Comparisons
among the three groups revealed significant differences between
the BB and BN groups, and between the BB and NB groups
(p< 0.01). With regard to the main effect of the questions, Q3 was
most often agreed with, followed by Q1; fewer participants agreed
with the other three statements (i.e., Q3>Q1>Q2=Q4=Q5,
p< 0.05). These findings suggest that the BB group agreed most
strongly with the statements related to the feeling of resonance and
then heaviness, although in general, the participants did not agree
with the statements related to resonance (Q2, 4, 5) compared to
those related to the feeling of heaviness (Q1, 3).
The results of hand movement and the questionnaire showed
that the participants in the BB group subjectively felt the weight
of the ball most heavily. They could have felt a need to adjust
to the perceived weight, since they were given instructions to keep
their hand horizontal throughout the trial. In the absence of actual
weight, we might have expected their hands to move higher as they
attempted to compensate for this illusory weight. The finding that
participants in the BB group raised their hands over the course
of the trial supports the hypothesis that they were compensating
for the subjective sense that they were holding a weighted ball. On
the contrary, participants in the BN group, who did not know that
the ball in the picture was heavy, did not raise their hand. Though
we might assume that this is because the BN group predicted that
the ball must be as light as it appeared to be, we conducted an
additional experiment to address the limitation revealed by this
problem.
EXPERIMENT 1B
In this follow-up experiment, minor changes were made in order
to examine the dynamic process of heaviness contagion (i.e.,
a within-participants procedure) as well as entire arm move-
ments (shoulder, elbow, wrist, and fingertip) for a longer period
of time (90 s). Furthermore, the no ball group in the previous
experiment was replaced with the light-ball group in the present
experiment to control for prediction of the weight of a ball in a
picture.
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FIGURE 4 | Questionnaire scores in each group in Experiment IA. It felt as
though your hand was weary and numb. It seemed as if the hand on the
screen was your own hand. It felt like your hand was moving lower. It seemed
as if the ball was put on your own hand. Your hand felt the weight of the ball.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
Participants
Eight participants (Five males and three females mean
age= 27.8 years, range= 22−44 years) were randomly divided
into two groups. Both groups saw a model’s hand holding a ball
and they also held a visually identical ball in their left hands. We
used two balls as the weight stimuli with visually indiscernible
differences: one was filled with sand (as in Experiment 1A: 1 kg);
the other was not filled with sand (130 g). The first group held a
weighted ball (heavy-ball group), whereas the second group held
a non-weighted ball (light-ball group). The former group antici-
pated that the ball in the pictures was heavy, but the latter group
anticipated that the ball was light.
Apparatus
We refurbished the apparatus, because the previous apparatus
appeared to be unique. We used a virtual screen to exclude
external noise (i.e., participants could only see the visual stimuli
over a black background) in the previous experiment, expect-
ing the participants to feel a sense of immersion. Furthermore,
although the mid-space mouse device, which was used to measure
hand movement, was not particularly light in weight (135 g), it
might nevertheless produce results. In this experiment, the pro-
jector device (WT615J, NEC, Tokyo, Japan) presented the visual
stimuli on the white board, located 1 m in front of the partici-
pants. We measured hand positions using a 3D motion-capture
device. Participants attached four infrared reflection markers to
the following body parts: shoulder (Position 1), elbow (Posi-
tion 2), wrist (Position 3), and tip of the middle finger (Posi-
tion 4). The 3D position of each marker was recorded using a
video-based 3D acquisition system, which, in turn, used two high-
speed CCD cameras (Himawari CL33; Library, Tokyo, Japan). The
sampling rate was 100 Hz; we finally down-sampled to 1 Hz using
averaging.
Procedure
The visual stimuli were presented in front of each participant as
they were seated, and they corresponded spatially to each partic-
ipant’s right arm. In this experiment, the pictures of the hand
holding a ball changed mid-course into those of pictures with no
ball. As in Experiment 1A, we instructed all the participants to
hold their right hand in a horizontal position throughout the
trial, which lasted 90 s. Our preliminary experiment suggested
that 90 s was the approximate limit that the hand could be held
in an approximately horizontal position. Participants were also
instructed to look at the visual stimuli, not their hand, as we
could not use an occluder, since it could visually block the hand
from the video cameras. The right arm was held out straight with
fingers stretched in order to ensure a horizontal position dur-
ing the course of a visual countdown of 3 s. The visual stimulus
was presented from the time of zero and the recording of the
hand position began. After 60 s, the image of a hand holding a
ball was changed to one of a hand with no ball (see Figure 5),
that is, a within-participants procedure was used in this experi-
ment, whereas a between-participants procedure was employed in
Experiment 1A. The order of the visual stimuli was fixed (that is,
“with ball” first, and then “without ball”) in the current experi-
ment because it is possible that the participants would experience
muscle fatigue during the latter half of the session (participants
who are presented with the “without ball” image first and then the
“with ball” image might not raise their hands because of muscle
fatigue), which would result in differences between the counter-
balanced groups that are not due to experimental manipulation.
Each participant completed a single trial where the following
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FIGURE 5 |Time course of the height of the hand (fingertips) in each
group in Experiment I B.
body parts were recorded: shoulder, elbow, wrist, and tip of the
middle finger.
Results and discussion
The time courses of the hand positions of the participants indi-
cated that the heavy-ball group tended to raise their right hand
over their shoulders gradually while observing a model’s hand
holding a ball; however, after 60 s, when the image was changed to
a picture of a hand without a ball, the hand started to lower. This
indicates that the hand raising was based on their shoulder as a
fulcrum point, because they might feel heaviness on the back of
the hand as if it were the model’s hand. Conversely, participants
in the light-ball group lowered their hands gradually (Figure 5;
Figure A1 in Appendix).
We conducted a two-way ANOVA (two groups× two visual
stimuli) to examine the movement velocity of the hand (i.e.,
fingertips; Figure 6). These analyses demonstrated a significant
main effect of group [F(1.6)= 6.00, p< 0.05], and a significant
main effect of visual stimuli [F(1.6)= 18.49, p< 0.01], but non-
significant interaction [F(1.6)= 0.67, p> 0.50]. It is clear that the
trend to raise the right hand was observed during the presentation
of the image of a model’s hand holding a ball, when partici-
pants simultaneously held a visually identical heavy ball in their
left hand, suggesting replication of Experiment 1A in a within-
participants manner. Conversely, after 60 s, participants in both
groups lowered their hands gradually, maybe because of expected
muscle fatigue. The present experiment aimed to observe arm
movement up to the limit of fatigue; however, there may be con-
founding between muscle fatigue and hand-lowering, though the
rising hands started lowering after just 60 s from the beginning of
the experiment (see Figure 5). We addressed this limitation in the
following experiments.
Experiment 1B reconfirmed the “heaviness contagion” overall;
observation of the model’s hand holding a heavy ball was asso-
ciated with raising of the hand. This could be driven predictively
(merely the prediction of heaviness raises the hand of a partici-
pant) and mandatorily (that is why participants must compensate
FIGURE 6 | Movement velocity in each group in Experiment lB.
for their illusory heaviness: they did not ignore it). However, a fur-
ther question must be addressed: which mechanism would cause
this phenomenon? The most probable mechanism is direct match-
ing, where we directly map the observed sensation of other agents
onto our own sensorimotor representation (Iacoboni et al., 1999).
Recent studies have suggested that the direct matching system,
which includes motor simulation, bodily resonance, and auto-
matic imitation, might have a biological bias (Press et al., 2005; Tsai
and Brass, 2007; Watanabe, 2008; Liepelt and Brass, 2010; Liepelt
et al., 2010), indicating that we do not simulate non-human agents.
Experiment 2A, with some changes in experimental procedure,
was conducted to address this issue. In the current experiment, we
presented“with ball”first, followed by“without ball,”and the dura-
tions of the two visual stimuli were different (60 s for “with ball”
and 30 s for “without ball”) in order to confirm that the raising of
the hand would continue for a longer time (as long as “with ball”
was presented), compared to Experiment 1A (45 s). In the next
experiment, we presented “with ball” in the middle of the session
with the same duration as the other visual stimuli conditions.
EXPERIMENT 2A
Our next aim was to show that heaviness contagion could be dri-
ven by observing a person, not by observing an object, because we
should simulate a co-specific counterpart in terms of MNS. Fur-
thermore, we made some minor changes. A model’s hand without
a ball was shown first, followed by the presentation of a model’s
hand holding a ball in order to control for hand-lowering caused by
muscle fatigue. Participants also repeated trials in this experiment
to indicate resistance to habituation.
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MATERIAL AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 17 participants (6 males and 11 females, mean
age= 19.5 years, range= 19−21 years) took part in this experi-
ment; however, one female dropped out because she could not
keep her hand in a horizontal position during the trials.
Apparatus
The apparatus was changed slightly. In this experiment, we showed
the visual stimuli on a 19′′ LCD display (LCD-AD19H, IO-DATA,
Tokyo, Japan), located 60 cm in front of the participants. The visual
stimuli were presented in front of each participant where they
were seated, and corresponded spatially to each participant’s right
arm. We measured hand positions using a high-speed camera (EX-
FC150, CASIO, Tokyo, Japan), which was located 1 m just behind
the right arm when the arm was raised horizontally. The sampling
rate was 120 Hz; we finally down-sampled to 1 Hz using averaging.
An occluder prevented the participants from seeing their right arm.
Procedure
As in Experiment 1, we instructed each participant to hold the
right hand in a horizontal position with their fingers stretched
throughout the trial, which lasted 60 s. For the first 20 s, the image
of a hand without the ball was presented. After 20 s, the image was
changed to one of a hand holding a ball. Furthermore, after 40 s,
the image of a hand holding a ball was changed to one of a ball
on a wooden block. The first and second images were the same as
those used in previous experiments, whereas the third was newly
prepared, so that the size of wooden block was approximately the
same as a model’s hand. All participants held a weighted ball (1 kg)
in the left hand during each trial to ensure that they were aware
of the weight of the ball in the picture. In this experiment, each
participant repeated three trials, with a fourth trial being the base-
line trial, throughout all of which the image of a hand without
a ball was presented (60 s). We calculated the average of the data
obtained from the first three trials, and then calculated the differ-
ence between that and the data of the fourth baseline trial with
regard to the height of the hand. This was done because our pilot
studies suggested that when participants repeated such trials, it
might have become increasing easy to lower their hand as the tri-
als progressed, even if sufficient rest was taken before each trial
(as with the results of Experiment 1B), possibly because of muscle
fatigue. We recorded the position of the tip of the middle finger in
this experiment.
Results and discussion
The time courses of the hand positions of the participants indi-
cated that they could keep the hand almost immobile for the first
20 s (a model’s hand with no ball), then tended to raise the hand
gradually for the next 20 s (a model’s hand with a ball), and then
could again keep the hand almost immobile for the last 20 s (a
ball on a wooden block; Figure 7). A one-way ANOVA (three
visual stimuli conditions) was conducted to examine the move-
ment velocity of the hand (Figure 8). These analyses demonstrated
a significant main effect of condition [F(2.30)= 4.42, p< 0.05],
and post hoc Ryan’s multi-comparison revealed significant differ-
ences between the first and second stimuli, and between the second
FIGURE 7 |Time course of the height of the hand in each condition in
Experiment 2A.
FIGURE 8 | Movement velocity in each condition in Experiment 2A.
and third stimuli (p< 0.05). These results suggest that the partic-
ipants tended to raise the hand only while observing a weighted
ball on a model’s hand, and not while observing a ball on a wooden
block.
As hypothesized, the heaviness contagion was induced by
observing a person, indicating that direct matching might be the
underlying mechanism (Iacoboni et al., 1999) and that MNS is the
underlying neural mechanism (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). A
hand-shaped object was not used because previous studies have
shown that its reality (i.e., its similarity to a real person’s hand)
might affect the simulation process of the observers (see General
Discussion for detail). Although the present experiment suggested
that an object shaped unlike a hand would not drive a feeling of
heaviness in the observers, further research should address this
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issue (e.g., by using a wooden hand, a robotic hand, a xeno-
geneic hand, etc.). Although the current experiment suggests that
the heaviness contagion as well as other motor simulation have
a biological basis (Liepelt and Brass, 2010; Liepelt et al., 2010),
previous studies, especially those in social psychology, have sug-
gested that different people affect our simulation mechanisms
differently (Calvo-Merino et al., 2006; Hein and Singer, 2008; Xu
et al., 2009). The following final experiment examined the type
of person, amongst a variety of people, who drives the heaviness
contagion of observers.
EXPERIMENT 2B
Finally, this experiment showed that a person who is similar to an
observer could drive a feeling of heaviness in that observer; as in
“like will to like.” We manipulated the visual appearance between
a model’s hand and each participant’s hand. It was hypothesized
that only those participants whose hand was similar to a model’s
hand would be subject to heaviness contagion.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 24 participants (four males and 20 females, mean
age= 19.5 years, range= 18–24 years) were randomly divided into
two groups, both of whom saw a model’s hand holding a ball, and
also held a visually identical ball in their left hands. Participants in
the first group wore a blue-glove on their right hand, which was
the same as the one that was worn on the model’s hand (this was
called the blue-glove group), whereas those in the second group
wore a yellow-glove (this was designated the yellow-glove group).
Both gloves weighed 50 g.
Apparatus
The experimental device and environment were identical to those
in Experiment 2A.
Procedure
As in previous experiments, we instructed each participant to hold
the right hand, on which a glove was worn, in a horizontal position
with their fingers stretched throughout the trial, which lasted 30 s.
For the first 15 s, the image of a hand without the ball was pre-
sented. After 15 s, the image was changed to one of a hand holding
a ball. All participants held a weighted ball (1 kg) in their left hand
during each trial, so that they were aware of the weight of the ball in
the picture. Each participant repeated three trials, with the fourth
trial being the baseline trial, throughout all of which the image of
a hand without a ball was presented (30 s), as in Experiment 2A.
We recorded the position of the tip of the middle finger.
Results and discussion
The time courses of the hand positions of the participants indi-
cated that those in both groups were capable of keeping the hand
almost immobile for the first 15 s (a model’s hand with no ball);
however, during the last 15 s (a model’s hand holding a ball), par-
ticipants in the blue-glove group, who were wearing the same glove
as worn on a model’s hand, tended to raise their hands, whereas
those in the yellow-glove group kept the hand still and almost
immobile (Figure 9).
FIGURE 9 |Time course of the height of the hand in each group in
Experiment 2B.
We conducted a two-way ANOVA (two visual stimuli× two
groups) to examine the movement velocity of the hand
(Figure 10). These analyses demonstrated a significant interac-
tion [F(1.22)= 5.53, p< 0.05], but no significant main effect of
group [F(1.22)= 1.29, p> 0.20] or visual stimuli [F(1.22)= 2.30,
p> 0.10]. The simple main effect of the group under the last visual
stimuli (a model’s hand holding a ball) condition and the sim-
ple main effect of visual stimuli under the blue-glove condition
were significant (p< 0.05). These results suggested that only par-
ticipants who wore the same glove as that worn by the model
tended to raise their hand while observing a model’s hand holding
a weighted ball.
This suggested that we have specific targets for motor simu-
lation, that is, a person who is “like me,” as suggested in some
previous studies (see General Discussion for detail). In the present
experiment, participants who wore a glove that was different from
that worn by the model did not feel illusory heaviness on their
hand, whereas in the previous experiments, although the partici-
pants did not wear a glove, they felt an illusory weight. This may
seem contradictory in the sense that the hands of both sets of
participants were visually different from the model’s hand. One
reason for this may be that in the previous experiments, the par-
ticipants perceived a model’s hand as a neutral hand wearing a
glove (the hand was merely one of others), whereas in the present
experiment, a model wearing a glove that is different from that
worn by the participants may appear as a person explicitly defined
as different from the participants themselves (the hand was one
of others that differ from mine), thereby indicating in-group vs.
out-group identification bias (see General Discussion). We shall
now explain our findings using the mechanism behind motor
simulation and how this may be construed as an expression of
empathy.
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FIGURE 10 | Movement velocity in each group in Experiment 2B.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of the present study suggest that we may ourselves
feel the heaviness felt by others, by observation alone (“heavi-
ness contagion”). This new phenomenon might be driven pre-
dictively (i.e., in the present study, the participants predicted
the feeling of heaviness experienced by another and raised their
own hands), mandatorily (since they did not ignore it, partic-
ipants in the present study needed to compensate for illusory
heaviness; Experiment 1AB), and as a potential expression of
empathy (the participants may have only responded to human
counterparts, especially a person who was like them; Experi-
ment 2AB). We shall discuss each factor with regard to extending
motor simulation theory and the potential neural mechanism
below.
SIMULATION OF OTHERS’ SENSATIONS IS PREDICTIVE
In our daily life, we can share many kinds of feelings with others,
which may promote our social interaction as a social animal (see
Iacoboni, 2009; Thioux and Keysers, 2010). Some previous studies
have suggested that this ability has been learned through our previ-
ous experiences, which are underpinned by neural-based learning,
such as experience-based Hebbian learning, or an internal model
that forms links between the sensory processing of actions and
motor plans (Iacoboni, 2009). Therefore, we appear to be able to
simulate the action of others only when that action is also part
of our own repertoires, especially with regard to skilled actions
(Calvo-Merino et al., 2005; Lahav et al., 2007; Aglioti et al., 2008).
Furthermore, we may also simulate the action or mental states of
others, through prediction or generalization based on a learned
model, if this action or mental state is not one that is particularly
complicated, even if this is something not previously experienced.
Patients with the rare syndrome of congenital insensitivity to pain
showed normal fMRI responses to observed pain in the anterior
mid-cingulate cortex and anterior insula (so-called shared circuits
for pain experienced by both the self and others (Danziger et al.,
2009), indicating that although they could not feel pain subjec-
tively, they could predict the sensation of it, despite no previous
experience of pain.
In general, how we feel depends on our predictions. This is true
even if the target is not included in our repertoire, as long as it is
simple. Size-weight illusion means smaller-sized objects feel heav-
ier than larger-sized objects of the same weight, suggesting that
we might predict weight from size, even for unfamiliar objects
(Ross, 1966; Flanagan and Beltzner, 2000). In addition, we might
see, hear, feel, taste, move, and perform as we predict (e.g., Bar-
ber and Calverley, 1964; Santarcangelo et al., 2005; Durgin et al.,
2007; Plassmann et al., 2008; Castle et al., 2012). The present study
suggested that this is also true in simulating others’ sensations; we
might be resonant with others as we predicted (Iacoboni et al.,
2005), indicating that motor simulation, which might be realized
by action-perception coupling (James, 1890), is one of our basic
processes, as with other perceptual functions. However, it only tar-
gets people (human agents), not objects (non-human agents). The
reason for why this function could be driven through prediction
is explained in the following discussion in terms of the target that
we resonate with.
SIMULATION OF OTHERS’ SENSATIONS IS MANDATORY
As a social animal, are we innately motivated to share feelings
with others? Some previous studies have differentiated the brain
activity that occurs between automatic and intentional empathy
or imitation, by comparing only seeing (evaluating skin color)
and actively sharing the feelings regarding the facial expressions
of others (de Greck et al., 2012), or by comparing finger move-
ments between only responding to a spatial cue and imitating
that cue (Bien et al., 2009). Although these studies have suggested
that we have an automatic and implicit function for simulation,
“automatic” does not always mean “mandatory,” in the sense that
we have a veto. It is possible that we could role-play the behav-
iors of others implicitly and automatically to promote our social
communications. Some other studies reported that observing an
action made by a human interferes with executed actions (Kilner
et al., 2003, 2007). Although these studies have suggested that we
do not ignore the observed actions of others, the possibility of
demand characteristics of study participants, that is, the ability
to speculate on the intention of the experimenters and to behave
as expected remains, and therefore should be carefully controlled
for, especially in this topic, because empathy or motor simulation
could be linked with the estimation of the intention of others (i.e.,
mind-reading; Singer, 2006). Study participants may be resonant
not with the stimuli, but with the experimenter (“experimenter
effects”). A compensatory reaction to sensation transmitted from
others is suggested by the results of the present study, and might
mean that the participants did not ignore the sensation, regardless
of the expectation of the experimenters, since they were doubly
blind to the purpose (our expectation was neither that the hand
could be kept immobile, nor that the hand might be lowered in
response to heaviness felt).
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This mandatory process might be underpinned by its poten-
tial neural mechanism. Because the MNS does not distinguish
between external (others) and internal (self) action representation,
it allows the individual to gain an experiential knowledge of the
observed action in the absence of any motor output, as if that per-
son is the agent of the action (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). This
indicates that we also need the process of distinguishing between
representation of the action of the self and of others, such as the
“who system”or the sense of agency or body ownership (Jeannerod
and Pacherie, 2004; Schutz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007) in order to
inhibit such a mandatory contagion in situations such as those
used in the present experiments. These functions might share the
same circuit in our brain (Miall, 2003). This distinguishing mech-
anism could contribute to the compensatory reaction to feelings
of heaviness. We can see that the participants totally disagreed, at
least subjectively, with the assertion that a model’s hand on the
screen appeared to be like their own hand (see Figure 4). They
did not prevent the contagion from others, but simultaneously
knew that it was not their own hand, which might lead to the need
to adjust to the perceived illusory weight. This is not conclusive
at the moment; however, it is essential to discuss self-other rep-
resentation comprehensively in further research: simultaneously
connecting and distinguishing between the functions of the self
and others.
WHO IS THE TARGET OF OUR SIMULATION?
Just as we do not constantly simulate, we also do not simulate
everybody. Previous studies have suggested that the amplitude of
empathic brain responses is modulated by the similarities between
the self and others, such as gender, race, or previous experience,
through observation (Calvo-Merino et al., 2006; Hein and Singer,
2008; Xu et al., 2009). A computational model-based approach
explains that this is not only because of this sense of famil-
iarity but also because individuals can predict the mental state
or action representation of others, based on their own knowl-
edge or learned model (Wolpert et al., 2003; Schutz-Bosbach and
Prinz, 2007). Mirroring others might help to understand what
another person is doing or feeling, or to predict what that indi-
vidual is most probably going to do next (Blakemore and Frith,
2005; Iacoboni et al., 2005). Thus, this prediction is modulated by
top-down processing, similar to animacy perception (Liepelt and
Brass, 2010; Liepelt et al., 2010), the impossibility of the action
(Longo et al., 2008), or spatial compatibility (Bertenthal et al.,
2006). The similarities between observers and targets, even if it
is a simple visual appearance as examined in the present study,
might enhance an observer’s predictability of others for a simula-
tion. The similarity effect may affect simulation responses through
the tendency of an observer to identify more closely with others
who appear to be similar to themselves, with regard to features
such as personality, visual appearance, cultural likeness, sentience,
or circumstance (Gruen and Mendelsohn, 1986; Brown et al.,
2006), that is, in-group empathy (Rae Westbury and Neumann,
2008).
This may also be true of the difference between humans and
other animals, or objects. It has been well documented that the
MNS might be activated when observing conspecific counterparts
(Gallese and Goldman, 1998), and, in line with this, some studies
have suggested that the amplitude of empathic responses is also
modulated by the phylogenetic similarity between the observers
and their targets (Hills, 1995; Rae Westbury and Neumann, 2008).
In addition, motor simulation has a biological bias (Press et al.,
2005; Tsai and Brass, 2007; Watanabe, 2008; Liepelt and Brass,
2010; Liepelt et al., 2010), indicating that we do not simulate non-
human agents. Nevertheless, other previous studies show that it is
possible to be resonant with those who are different from us, such
as people with different cultural backgrounds, animals, cartoon
characters, and artificial objects, even early in life (Abell et al., 2000;
Buccino et al., 2004; Hamlin et al., 2007; Perry et al., 2010). We can
feel pain on the virtual or artificial hand (Ehrsson et al., 2007;
Hägni et al., 2008), whereas observing an action made by a robot
might not interfere with executed actions (Kilner et al., 2003).
However, action-speed contagion might be driven by point-light
biological motions (Watanabe, 2008) or the motor priming effect,
which is an expression of motor simulation that is possibly mod-
ulated by beliefs about animacy or even virtualness of the hand
(Longo and Bertenthal, 2009; Liepelt and Brass, 2010). Although
it is also possible that biological tuning of motor simulation is
highly action-selective (Liepelt et al., 2010), it might be presently
difficult to form clear criteria for differentiating between the agents
that we can be resonant with and the ones that we cannot. Never-
theless, since illusory body ownership of an artificial object might
depend on its corporeality (Tsakiris et al., 2010), as the present
study also suggested, we might again assume the importance of a
similarity between observers and targets, which could make us feel
closer to others (even animals or objects), and therefore to which
we could apply our own knowledge. However, there is still a large
gap between the lower level of self-other representation such as
sensorimotor direct matching or motor simulation and the higher
level of it such as top-down biological bias or in-/out-group empa-
thy. Therefore, future research should tackle this problem in terms
of social cognition (Farmer et al., 2012).
LIMITATION OF THE CURRENT STUDY
The present study suggested the new behavioral phenomenon
of motor simulation in order to develop a background the-
ory. The behavioral evidence of motor simulation, however, is
not always compatible with neuroscientific or subjective report
studies. Observing others’ action evokes the cortical activation
(Iacoboni et al., 1999) but it does not evoke the execution of
the movement; an exception is people with pathological condi-
tions (see for review, Bertenthal et al., 2006). We can observe this
through the facilitation in reaction time when observers do the
same (e.g., Liepelt and Brass, 2010; Liepelt et al., 2010) or even
unrelated action (Brass et al., 2000; Watanabe, 2008). Furthermore,
our brain is activated in response to observed tactile stimuli to oth-
ers (Keysers et al., 2004); however, except for specific people with
mirror-touch synesthesia (Blakemore et al., 2005) who could have
enhanced subjective empathy traits, we do not generally feel this
tactility in reality (Banissy and Ward, 2007). As discussed, this may
be because of the inhibition process that we possess to block auto-
matic contagion. Therefore, to increase the behavioral response of
study participants, our experimental methodology used a unique
procedure: a ball was held during trials, and not just felt its heavi-
ness before trials. This might give a potential artifact, although this
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was carefully controlled for in our experiments (that is, a poten-
tial effect of holding a ball: see Experiment 1A). Further studies
should refine what information would be needed from others, as
well as how and when it is needed, in order to elicit heaviness
contagion.
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APPENDIX
FIGURE A1 |Time course of the height of the hand (four positions) in each group in Experiment lB.
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